MQ-8B Fire Scout Program Support Analysis For Commander Helicopter Maritime Strike Wing Atlantic Fleet by Gerhart, Michael et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-03-10
MQ-8B Fire Scout Program Support
Analysis For Commander Helicopter
Maritime Strike Wing Atlantic Fleet
Gerhart, Michael















MQ-8B Fire Scout Program Support Analysis 
For 
Commander Helicopter Maritime Strike Wing Atlantic Fleet 
 
 




Lieutenant Michael R. Gerhart 
Lieutenant Kyle C. Peitzmeier 
Lieutenant William D.Vann 
























MQ-8B Fire Scout Program Support Analysis 
  
The Navy finds itself facing a period of increasing transformation as the second decade of the 
21
st
 century quickly approaches.  Having been forced to shift its focus away from „blue 
water‟ operations to the littorals to confront the emerging threats posed by global terrorism 
and rogue states, the Navy must accomplish this transformation with constrained fiscal 
resources and an aging fleet at home.  New initiatives, such as Sea Power 21, will help the 
Navy adapt to this new environment, and will drastically change the way the Navy trains for, 
fights, and wins the nation‟s wars of the future. 
 
A major tenant of Sea Power 21 is to acquire new weapons‟ systems to help the Navy adapt 
to its new role in the joint war fighting environment.  In addition to manned systems, the 
Navy will also procure new, more complex, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to support a 
wide range of mission subsets.  While Commander Helicopter Maritime Strike Wing Atlantic 
Fleet (COMHSMWINGLANT) and the LAMPS Mk III community are already transitioning 
to the MH-60R helicopter to replace the venerable SH-60B Seahawk, naval leadership has 
already begun proposing the incorporation of the MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Take-
off/Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) into existing HSM/HSL squadrons and 
detachments.  
 
To test the feasibility of deploying the MQ-8B with a LAMPS detachment, the Navy has 
tasked Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light Four Two (HSL-42) Detachment SEVEN 
(DET 7) to deploy with two VTUAVs during a scheduled deployment in 2009 aboard USS 
McInerney (FFG-8).  This detachment will operate and maintain the Fire Scout, and will help 
further refine the Navy‟s existing concept of operations (CONOPS) for the VTUAV.  If 
successful, this testing could provide the Navy with the data necessary to help requisition 
further funding for Fire Scout incorporation on existing surface warships.   
 
To aid COMHSMWINGLANT in risk mitigation and planning, Team Mayport identified 
potential impacts on required detachment manning levels, training needed, duration of 
training and its impact on readiness, necessary infrastructure, the impact on current 
detachment operational capabilities, and maintenance.  While these factors will have a 
significant impact on HSM/HSL squadrons and existing warships, Team Mayport focused 
their efforts on factors affecting detachments only.  Interviews were conducted with HSL-42, 
FFG-8 personnel, the VTUAV Fleet Integration Team (FIT), NAVAIR 1.2 Ship/Aviation 
Integration Team, and COMHSMWINGLANT staff to gather data necessary to achieve the 
Team‟s objectives.  Extensive research was also conducted utilizing existing documentation 
regarding the Fire Scout including draft proposals, CONOPS, Manpower Estimation Reports 
(MERs), as well as information published commercially. 
 
Team Mayport found that, while there may still be a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the 
VTUAV, the incorporation of the VTUAV into existing COMHSMWINGLANT force 
 iv 
structures will only improve the Wing‟s overall mission effectiveness.  The Fire Scout will 
provide more flexibility and will complement existing wing capabilities.   The incorporation 
of the Fire Scout will also help to reduce associated helicopter maintenance costs by reducing 
helicopter flight hours.  It is possible, however, that the reduction in maintenance costs may 
be offset by a decrease in aircrew proficiency as expeditionary flight crews will certainly fly 
less, and will be required to be duel qualified in both the H-60 and MQ-8B. 
 
Team Mayport recommends that COMHSMWINGLANT leadership consider the 
ramifications of reduced manning for LCS composite aviation detachments, and utilize the 
standard detachment construct for two-plane detachments aboard existing warships.  The 
Team further recommends that leadership closely consider the cultural impacts of 
incorporating the MQ-8B into existing force structures.  In addition, Wing leadership should 
conduct a sight survey of training facilities to determine their ability to support future 
VTUAV training.  Team Mayport is confident that information gathered from HSL-42 
Detachment 7‟s 2009 deployment will further support these findings, and will aid in the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The MQ-8B is a VTUAV that was originally designed as a complementary 
intelligence, surveillance, attack, and reconnaissance (ISAR) UAV for the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS).  Since the LCS program has experienced severe delays in its delivery schedule, 
however, naval planners have gone forward with planning to utilize the MQ-8B on existing 
surface combatants.  A recent development in this planning has been the formulation of a 
detachment from HSL-42 to aid in the creation of a concept of operations for future use of 
the Fire Scout on existing warships during their upcoming deployment scheduled for late 
2009 aboard USS McInerney (FFG-8).  A COMHSMWINGLANT asset was chosen to 
perform this duty because existing LCS and VTUAV CONOPS identify LAMPS 
detachments as the primary operators and maintainers of this system. 
 
To aid in risk mitigation and planning, COMHSMWINGLANT directed Team Mayport to 
conduct a support analysis of the proposed utilization of Wing detachments to operate and 
support the MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV for future shipboard use.  Team Mayport found, 
however, that there were significant gaps in information available for the use of the VTUAV 
aboard existing warships.  Most information available pertained to plans for use aboard LCS.  
Manning levels for LCS were based on a 23 man detachment that was primarily driven by the 
desire for reduced manning.  Navy leadership arrived at this construct after careful 
risk/reward analysis, but Team Mayport believes that a two-plane manning construct would 
provide greater operational flexibility and safety compared to the 23 man detachment, 
without imposing any additional cost to the Navy.     
 
Team Mayport further recommends that leadership give special consideration to the cultural 
impacts resulting from VTUAV introduction.  Because the operation of the VTUAV does not 
require pilot input for flight control operation, leadership must consider what impact this will 
have on flight crews.  Furthermore, flight crews will be required to be dual rated in both the 
VTUAV and H-60.  This added responsibility may be exasperated with the introduction of 
the MH-60R because of its increased level of complexity over the SH-60B.  These factors 
combined may have a detrimental effect on aircrew quality of service.   
 
Team Mayport also identified a need for a sight survey to determine the wing‟s ability to 
absorb VTUAV training once fully introduced.  This training will be primarily computer 
based in the future, and may become shorter in duration, but a requirement will exist for 
additional space for Ground Control Station simulator installation. 
 
Upon completion of their 2009 deployment, HSL-42 Detachment 7 will provide information 
to supplement Team Mayport‟s findings.  Team Mayport recommends Wing leadership 
conduct a mid-cruise and post-cruise evaluation of „lessons learned‟ to determine the merits 
of detachment manning, operations, training, and maintenance practices.  
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B.   BACKGROUND 
 
The MQ-8B “Fire Scout” is a VTUAV that has been developed by Northrop 
Grumman, in conjunction with Lockheed Martin and the Schweitzer Aircraft Corporation, 
for the U.S. Navy to satisfy the military‟s joint requirement for an inexpensive air vehicle 
that is capable of performing the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting 
(ISAR) mission.  The MQ-8B is unique among second generation UAVs in that it is a rotary 
wing aircraft, based off the Schweitzer 333SP manned turbo-shaft helicopter design.  The 
four bladed UAV weighs approximately 3,200 pounds, and will carry a wide array of mission 
sensors including RADAR, electronic warfare support (ESM) systems, forward looking 
infrared (FLIR), and electro-optical (EO) sensors, with room for future additions and 
armament.  With a service ceiling of just over 20,000 feet, and a max airspeed of 125 knots, 
the Fire Scout will be able to stay on station in a hostile environment for nearly 8 hours, 
dramatically improving the naval war fighter‟s situational awareness.   
 
The Navy had originally planned to deploy the Fire Scout aboard the LCS, but controversy 
surrounding the LCS program has created doubt as to whether or not this will be the case.  
The LCS program began as a design competition between Lockheed Martin and General 
Dynamics to produce a surface combatant optimized for operating in the complex littoral 
environment.  This approach was thought to help reduce procurement costs, and to help 
further refine the new ship‟s concept of operations.1  However, original proposed 
construction costs of $220 million per hull have risen steadily to approximately $450 million, 
not including the modular mission packages that are to accompany the vessels.2  Cost 
overruns in both the General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin designs have forced the Navy 
to cancel planned hulls from each builder.  It is currently unclear when construction will 
continue. 
 
In February of 2000, the Department of Defense awarded Northrop Grumman an initial 
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract (Milestone I&II), worth 
$93,721,957, to develop the VTUAV.  This model was dubbed the RQ-8A “Fire Scout”.  The 
RQ-8A VTUAV system contained the following sub components:  air vehicle (AV), ground 
control stations (GCSs), modular mission payloads (MMPs), data links, remote data 
terminals (RDTs), launch and recovery equipment, and tactical communications equipment.3  
Flight testing for the RQ-8A begun in 2002, and in December of 2003, the Fire Scout 
completed its 100
th
 successful flight, accumulating nearly 75 flight hours. 
                                                 
1  GlobalSecurity.org. Littoral Combat Ship Program. [Accessed on 15 February, 2009] Available from the 
World Wide Web @http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcs-program.htm 
2  Defense Industry Daily. The USA‟s New Littoral Combat Ships.  [Accessed on 15 February, 2009] Available 
from the World Wide Web @http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-
updated-01343/  
3  Pike, John.  Vertical Take Off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) Overview.  Federation of 
American Scientists, 2000. [Accessed on 15 February, 2009] Available from the World Wide Web 
@http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/vtuav.htm 
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As the development for the VTUAV progressed, the RQ-8A was re-designated MQ-8B after 
a number of structural and mechanical changes were made to the airframe and mission 
systems.  This change was driven by the RQ-8A‟s poor performance during initial testing, 
and subsequent withdrawal from the program by the Navy.  To satisfy DoD requirements, 
Northrop Grumman redesigned the Fire Scout‟s airframe, power plant, and incorporated an 
additional rotor blade (for a total of four blades).  These improvements dramatically 
increased the Fire Scout‟s range and on-station time.  With these new modifications, 
Northrop Grumman re-designated the Fire Scout MQ-8B.  This re-designation was an 
indicator of the improved multi-mission capability of the new VTUAV.  In August of 2003, 
the Army selected the Fire Scout as its unmanned air system for its Future Combat System 
(FCS) program.  The Navy subsequently regained interest in the program, which was initially 
supposed to reach IOC by Q4 FY 2003.4 
  
The Fire Scout saw many firsts in its progression through the defense acquisitions framework 
in 2006.  On 16 January, 2006, the MQ-8B reached its first major developmental milestone 
by autonomously completing nine launch and recovery cycles aboard the USS Nashville, the 
first such accomplishment of any DOD developmental UAV.5  In February, the MQ-8B 
effectively demonstrated its ability to extend its communications range over the horizon 
(OTH) by using the system‟s Beyond Line-of-Sight tactical UAV communications relay.  In 
August of 2006, the Navy awarded Northrop Grumman a $135.8 million modification to its 
earlier contract.  This contract extension signified the Navy‟s continued commitment to the 
program, and solidified Northrop‟s continued progression through the program‟s Systems 
Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase.6 
  
The MQ-8B, an ACAT IC program, reached Milestone C in the defense acquisition system 
on 31 May, 2007 signifying its entry into Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), and is 
expected to reach Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in 2009 following successful 
Operational Evaluation (OpEval).7  Deliveries of initial LRIP units are expected in FY 2009 
with final delivery early in FY 2010, but delays in the procurement schedule for the Littoral 
Combat Ship could affect this timeline. 
 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 
The goal of the this project was to identify the critical operational, cost mitigation, 
and human resource management issues associated with the potential manning of the Fire 
Scout by COMHSMWINGLANT detachments.  We explored a number of factors in our 
analysis including:  required detachment manning levels, training needed, duration of 
training and its impact on readiness, necessary infrastructure, and the impact on current 
                                                 
4  Pike, John. MQ-8B Fire Scout.  GlobalSecurity.org, 2007.  [Accessed on 14 February 2009]  Available from 
the World Wide Web @http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/mq-8b.htm  
5  Ibid.  
6  Freeland, Rene. MQ-8B Fact Sheet. Northrop Grumman, 2008 [Accessed on 14 February 2009]  Available 
from the World Wide Web @http://www.is.northropgrumman.com/systems/system_pdfs/FS-Fact-Sheet.pdf  
7 Ibid. 
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detachment operational capabilities.  Our analysis addresses the benefits of the proposed 
MQ-8B implementation plan, and will provide COMHSMWINGLANT leadership with the 
information necessary to identify the most cost effective and operationally beneficial means 




The following represents a brief overview of the methodology used to meet our 
project objectives. 
 
1. Background Research 
The team initially gathered information regarding the Fire Scout VTUAV 
program.  This included internet research of UAV programs and Northrop Grumman 
websites.  Secondly, we initially contacted and gathered data from HSL-42, PMA-266, and 
the Fleet Integration Team (FIT).  
 
2. Data Analysis 
An initial team session was held to analyze what was known about VTUAV 
operations, current assumptions about its future use, plans for its upcoming deployment, and 
issues already identified by those charged with its operation aboard USS McInerney.  From 
this analysis, assumptions were updated and questions were formulated for in-depth 
exploration with subject matter experts during one-on-one interviews.   
 
3. Interview Process 
Formal interviews were conducted with HSL-42 Detachment 7 personnel and 
senior leadership aboard USS McInerney. Subject matter experts at the VTUAV Fleet 
Integration Team, San Diego, California were also interviewed via telephone.  
 
Informal interviews were conducted with numerous VTUAV experts at PMA-266 and 
NAVAIR.    A hands on hanger discussion was attended at NS Mayport with members from 
VX-1 and Northrop Grumman in attendance. 
 
4. Analysis 
Using the information obtained from interviews and available documentation, 
Team Mayport looked for potential impacts on detachment operations, manning, training, 
and maintenance.  In some instances, data collected by the Team was incomplete.  This was 








5. Project Feedback 
Team Mayport will meet with their client, COMHSMWINGLANT, to provide 
feedback and recommendations regarding the VTUAV program.  It is our hope that the 
results of the research will be used by subject matter experts to improve future VTUAV 
composite detachment operations. 
 
E.  SCOPE 
 
Team Mayport‟s research examines the needs and priorities of our client and other 
stakeholders involved with the proposed operation of the Fire Scout.  The primary focus was 
to identify the critical issues associated with HSM/HSL detachments operating the MQ-8B.  
The Team‟s analysis and findings will be offered to COMHSMWINGLANT to aid in the 
formulation of informed decisions regarding the future incorporation of the MQ-8B. 
  
Since the future of LCS is currently in doubt, the conclusions and recommendations 
contained in this report are primarily focused on FFG operations.  Assumptions were made 




























II. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. INTERVIEWS  
 
See Appendix A. 
 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
 
1.   Concept of Operations 
 
To effectively analyze the impacts of VTUAV integration on detachment 
operations, Team Mayport reviewed a recent draft VTUAV CONOPS obtained from the 
Fleet Integration Team (FIT), and VTUAV Manpower Estimate Reports (MER) obtained 
from NAVAIR.  Team Mayport also interviewed representatives from the VTUAV FIT, 
HSL-42 Detachment 7 personnel, NAVAIR‟s Aviation/Ship Integration Team, and the 
current COMHSMWINGLANT VTUAV transition officer. 
 
It is important to note that most of the documentation available on Fire Scout is focused on 
its use aboard the LCS.  Team Mayport was unable to find any data that pertained to its use 
aboard existing surface combatants.  This is in large part due to the fact that OpEval has not 
been conducted for the Fire Scout, and funding has not yet been received to reconfigure 
existing sea frames to support the VTUAV. OpEval for Fire Scout is currently scheduled to 
take place by the end of 2009.  Team Mayport estimates that additional data will become 
available once OpEval is complete.   
 
Crucial insight on aviation detachment (AVDET) manning on LCS was provided to Team 
Mayport from NAVAIR‟s Aviation/Ship Integration Team.  Current planning indicates that 
the Navy is moving forward with a 23 man combined aviation detachment for LCS.  This 
combined detachment will be responsible for operating and maintaining both the Fire Scout 
VTUAV and MH-60R.  
 
a.   System Description 
 
Initial versions of the MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV system will be 
comprised of six essential subcomponents: 
 
 Air Vehicle (AV) 
 USN Tactical UAV Ground Control Station (GCS) 
 UAV Common Automatic Recovery System (UCARS) 
 Light Harpoon Landing Restraint System (LHLRS) 
 Brite Star II FLIR/EO/LDRF  
 Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) 
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The air vehicle, as depicted in Figure 1, is based on the Schweitzer 333SP manned turbo-
shaft design, and is a second generation, unmanned, single engine helicopter.  The AV has an 
all-metal, four-blade, folding main rotor, a metal and composite two-blade tail rotor, and a 
metal airframe.  The main rotor blades are fully articulated and can be folded for stowage and 




Figure 1 – MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV9 
 
The Fire Scout can take-off and land autonomously from VTUAV configured surface 
combatants, and is designed to follow a preprogrammed path set by the Air Vehicle Operator 
(AVO).  The AV will fly this preprogrammed path until ordered to land, or until it loses 
communication with its control station, at which point the AV will either attempt to 
reestablish communications, or divert to a pre-selected landing site.  There is no flight control 
input available from the GCS.  All flight control inputs are performed automatically by the 
AV as necessary to fly its preprogrammed flight path. 
 
The Fire Scout utilizes a modular design.  This enables the “plug and play” of various 
payloads for various operations.  Initial variants of the Fire Scout are expected to utilize the 
Brite Star II EO/IR/LDRF system seen in Figure 2; however, future variants will be equipped 
with a wide variety of modular mission payloads (MMPs).  These MMPs may include 
RADAR, ESM, communication relay equipment, and forward firing munitions. 
                                                 
8  NAVAIR.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May 2007.  


















Figure 2 – Brite Star II10 
 
Like other UAV systems, the Fire Scout is operated by a GCS.  The Fire Scout‟s GCS is 
designed to be housed on board the LCS in the Combat Information Center.11   Installation of 
the GCS on the FFG-8 class warship will be in the STIR equipment room.  The GCS, as 
depicted in figure 4, consists of two stations for the AVO and the Mission Payload Operator 
(MPO), but unlike other UAVs, the GCS for Fire Scout can operate multiple AVs 
simultaneously.12    
 
The UCARS gives the Fire Scout autonomous take-off and landing capability.  The UCARS 
tracking antenna is depicted below in Figure 4.  The UCARS uses ship‟s motion sensor data 
to provide precise ship/AV position information to the AV to effect take-off and landing.  
The Fire Scout‟s recovery cycle is depicted in Figure 3. The UCARS tracking antenna tracks 
the AV‟s transponder signal to measure relative distance to the landing point, and is capable 
of allowing the AV to compensate for the ship‟s air-wake.  Once in a position to land, the 
Fire Scout will use the LHLRS which consists of a moveable platform, and a hook and grid, 
harpoon restraining system.13 
 
Another component of the Fire Scout system is the Tactical Control System (TCS).  Working 
in conjunction with the TCDL, this system consists of the hardware and software that allows 
for various levels of control of the UAV.  Other platforms, using TCS, will be able to control 
                                                 
10  PMA 263.  Manpower Estimate Report for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (VTUAV).  NAVAIR, March 2007. 
11  Northrop Grumman. RQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air Vehicle. [Accessed 12 JAN 2009] 
Available from World Wide Web @http://www.is.northropgrumman.com/systems/system_pdfs/FireScout-
New-Brochure.pdf 
12  Jane‟s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, Northrop Grumman, MQ-8 Fire Scout [Accessed 12 JAN 
2009] Available from World Wide Web @http://juav.janes.com/ public/juav/index.html  
13  NAVAIR.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May 2007.   
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the Fire Scout.  A demonstration of this capability was provided when a P-3C using the TCS 















                                                 
14  NAVAIR.  NAVAIR Demonstrates UAV Control At Highest Level. [Accessed 12 January 2009] Available 
from World Wide Web @http://uav.navair.navy.mil/new_firescout/news/rotorhub(UK).pdf 
















Figure 4 – Fire Scout UCARS Antenna/Ground Control Station16 
 
b.   Utilization 
 
The MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV was designed as a complementary 
ISAR UAV that will support existing and future surface combatants.   The Fire Scout, as 
depicted in Figure 5, will be capable of assisting surface combatants in Anti-Surface Warfare 
(ASU), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine-Interdiction Warfare (MIW), and limited 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).17  Baseline models will be equipped with the 
BRITE Star II FLIR/EO device.  Future models will be equipped with RADAR, the Coastal  
Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) system, mine detection unit, ESM, and 
possibly forward firing weapons. 
 
The Fire Scout AV will be operated via GCS and TCDL by a two man crew derived from 
composite aviation detachments aboard the host ship.  The AVO will be a dual rated MH-
60/MQ-8B pilot, and will most likely act as the Mission Commander. The AVO will be 
responsible for monitoring AV status and controlling launch, flight, and recovery.  The MPO 
will be a dual rated Aviation Warfare Systems Operator (AW), and will operate, evaluate, 





                                                 
16  PMA 263. VTUAV Integrated Logistics Support Overview.  NAVAIR, 2008. 
17  NAVAIR.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May 2007. 




Figure 5 – VTUAV Operational View19 
 
For LCS operations, composite AVDETS will be comprised of either HSM or HSC 
personnel depending on desired mission subset.  HSM detachments will be deployed to 
support ASU and ASW missions, and will operate two AVs.  HSC detachments will support 
the MIW mission, and will operate one AV.20  It is unclear if this convention will be true for 
future operations aboard existing surface combatants. 
 
 c.   Detachment Composition 
 
The VTUAV CONOPS and MER both call for a composite aviation 
detachment comprised of 23 personnel.  As stated previously, these documents only reflect 
manning for LCS as seen in Figure 6.  The MER points out that the 23 man construct for 
LCS was developed from modeling and analysis conducted by NAVAIR 1.2, the results of 
which were published in LCS/DD(X) Alternative Aviation Support Study, dated 18 August 
2005.21  The major limiting factors for detachment size were berthing available aboard LCS, 
and the desire to reduce crew size to 75 personnel.22  Risk Assessment contained in the MER 
suggests that the 23 man construct may be inadequate to support all aviation requirements as 
set forth in the LCS CONOPS.  The MER further assigned a risk code of medium to 
                                                 
19  NAVAIR.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May 2007. 
20  PMA 263.  Manpower Estimate Report for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (VTUAV).  NAVAIR, March 2007. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Rose, William.  NAVAIR 1.2 Aviation/Ship Integration Team.  Email dated 9 February, 2009. 
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detachment manning, and called for additional verification of manning levels once the 






















Figure 6 – LCS Composite Aviation Detachment Manning23 
 
d.   Detachment Operational Tempo 
 
Figure 7 depicts proposed detachment flight hour ratios for LCS based 
on the number of VTUAVs embarked.  This graphic was obtained from CNAF FIT briefs to 
CUSFFC, and was derived from NAVAIR 1.2 modeling to support the LCS/DD(X) 
Alternative Aviation Support Study.  Based on NAVAIR‟s data, CUSFFC ultimately decided 
on the 23 man composite aviation detachment construct.24  These ratios assume a 24 hour 
work day, utilizing two maintenance shifts, and maximum crew rest/day as delineated by 
OPNAV 3710.7T.  They also assume flight operations are constrained by single spot aviation 
capable warships.25   
 
Figure 7 effectively demonstrates that increased utilization of VTUAVs could dramatically 
reduce the number of flight hours achievable for use by aircrews.  The ratio indicated by the 
star on Figure 7 reflects the projected nominal operating tempo for composite detachments.  
If this model proves consistent with actual operations, each pilot will be able to fly an 




                                                 
23  PMA 263.  Manpower Estimate Report for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (VTUAV).  NAVAIR, March 2007. 
24  Rose, William. NAVAIR 1.2 Aviation/Ship Integration Team.  Email dated 9 February, 2009. 




Figure 7 – LCS monthly flight hours26 
 
2.   Training and Readiness Considerations  
 
AVDET personnel will receive VTUAV specific training in accordance with 
the VTUAV CONOPS and other associated naval directives.  This training will take place 
prior to the AVDET-ship team workup cycle under the construct of “train as needed” for the 
mission specific deployment, much like other weapon systems that an operator may 
require.27  Since VTUAV and HSM/HSL detachment personnel will operate, maintain, and 
train for both airframe system types, these personnel will be qualified H-60 aircrew and 
maintenance personnel.  For the purpose of this analysis, aircrew personnel are those 
individuals who are directly responsible for the operation of the AV and its associated 
controls.  Maintenance personnel are those members of the AVDET who are responsible for 
all Organizational level (O-level) upkeep and care of the AV itself. 
 
The VTUAV Program Office (NAVAIR PMA 266) and the VTUAV FIT will lead the 
acquisition of the VTUAV training system.  A systems approach has been applied to the 
analysis, design, development, implementation, and conduct of the training program, which 
                                                 
26  Criger, Tom.  Aviation Manning Aboard LCS. U.S. Fleet Forces Command, October 2006. 
27  Naval Air Systems Command.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May 2007. 
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will provide designated H-60/VTUAV composite squadron personnel with the knowledge, 
skills, and abilities (KSA) necessary to operate and employ the VTUAV system effectively.28 
 
The Naval Training System Plan (NTSP) for the VTUAV, the N88-NTSP A-50-0004 May 
2007 and DoD Instruction 3020.37, details the intent of the VTUAV training program and 
any applicable “mission essential” training requirements.  The intent of the VTUAV program 
is to provide proficient AVO, MPO, and O-level maintenance personnel.  New and evolving 
technologies and existing models that represent training requirements for the aviation 
communities will be used to improve the quality of training and make the training more 
affordable.29 
 
a.   Aircrew Level Training 
 
Training for operators is currently being conducted by training teams 
from the primary contractor, Northrop Grumman Corporation at NAVAIR concentration 
facilities, Patuxent River Naval Base.  This training currently lasts for approximately five 
weeks and is provided via instructor-led, paper-based courseware.30  Estimated student 
throughput and instructor requirements, assuming a single training location, are summarized 









Figure 8 – Estimated Annual Training Requirement for the VTUAV Program31 
 
is to conduct training for operators at designated Fleet Replacement Squadron training 
facilities at NAS North Island, San Diego and NS Mayport, Florida.  This training will 
comprise of post-FRS courses lasting from three to five weeks which will incorporate the 
development of interactive courseware and simulators/training devices.  The goal is to have 
all aircrew training and proficiency events flown in the trainer.32  There is no plan to conduct 
VTUAV AV training flights ashore.  Exact course requirements and optimum delivery 
methods will be determined through analysis, as part of the Instructional Systems 
Development process.  This training will fall under the cognizance of the FRS CO with 
                                                 
28  PMA 263.  Manpower Estimate Report for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (VTUAV).  NAVAIR, March 2007. 
29  NAVAIR.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May 2007. 
30  NAVAIR.  VTUAV Program Integrated Logistics Support Overview.  Dated January 2008. 
31  PMA 263.  Manpower Estimate Report for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (VTUAV).  NAVAIR, March 2007. 
32  Fitzgerald, Chris. LCS Aviation HSL-42.  CNAF VTUAV Fleet Integration Team, June 2008. 
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secondary cognizance authority resting with the WWS CO.33  Training of operators will 
comprise of AVO/MC training for H-60 pilots and MPO training for H-60 AWs. 
 
b.   Maintenance Level Training 
 
Initial VTUAV maintenance training will be provided by technical 
representatives from Northrop Grumman with future training to be completed at a Center of 
Naval Aviation Technical Training Unit (CNATTU).34  The goal of PMA 266 and the FIT is 
to co-locate this training with the H-60 Expeditionary Squadron Fleet concentration areas.  
All current maintenance AVDET rates will play a role in the upkeep and care of the AV.  
Estimated maintenance manpower to account for VTUAV pipeline training is summarized 
above in Figure 8.  As of the date of this report, there is currently no manpower training 
requirement for shipboard personnel.  Until analysis is conducted to determine the impact to 
shipboard manpower requirements with interaction of VTUAV systems, AVDET 
maintenance personnel will be responsible for VTUAV subsystems to include Integrated 
GCS, TCDL Data Suite, UCARS, and Talon Landing Grid.  A Northrop Grumman technical 
representative will be accompanying HSL-42 Detachment 7 on board USS McInerney to 
provide any on-sight technical training and assistance of this equipment as necessary. 
 
c.   Contractor Responsibilities 
 
It is anticipated that Northrop Grumman will also be used to develop 
and conduct program familiarization training for government personnel involved in initial 
low-rate production and initial training of government personnel involved in Operational 
Testing (OT).  It is further anticipated that Northrop Grumman will be used to provide initial 
Navy site activation training at any location, until such time as the Navy is capable of 
assuming such duties.  Cost avoidance/reductions associated with sharing training curriculum 
and facilities, and reuse of pertinent existing aviation-related curricula, will be explored 
where commonality and applicability permit.35 
 
3. Maintenance Requirements 
 
The VTUAV system will be maintained by active duty personnel attached to 
composite H-60/VTUAV squadrons.  Supportability is tailored to a two level maintenance 
concept:  O-level and Depot or Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).  O-level support 
includes scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, and on-AV repair at the unit level.36  
Depot/OEM maintenance consists of major repairs, overhauls, testing, and repairs to 
components beyond the capabilities of unit/organizational maintenance.  The addition of 
                                                 
33  Fitzgerald, Chris. LCS Aviation HSL-42.  CNAF VTUAV Fleet Integration Team, June 2008. 
34  NAVAIR.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May 2007. 
35  PMA 263.  Manpower Estimate Report for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (VTUAV).  NAVAIR, March 2007. 
36  NAVAIR.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May 2007. 
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Intermediate level (I-level) maintenance may be appropriate based on the post-fielding 
analysis of Logistics Management Information (LMI) maintenance and repair data.37  All 
maintenance will be performed in accordance with the guidelines and processes outlined in 
the COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2 series and the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program 
(NAMP) manuals. 
 
a.   AVDET Maintenance Concept 
 
Preventive and corrective maintenance tasks will be accomplished 
onboard existing warships by composite AVDET personnel and could include but are not 
limited to: 
 
 • Flight launch and recover, handling, transportation readiness and emplacement 
 • Servicing turnaround and servicing to include refueling/de-fueling 
 • Daily inspections and light corrosion control 
 • Removal and replacement of Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs) 
 • MMP swap out 
 • Quality assurance38 
 
Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETM) organizational maintenance publications 
have been designed to display on portable electronic display devices that are used in lieu of 
technical manuals.  Electronic data modules are provided for overall VTUAV system 
description and include all maintenance procedures, illustrated parts breakdown, 
system/functional description, maintenance requirement cards, wiring diagram manual, 
NATOPS and pocket checklists, and general series manuals.39 
 
AVDET maintainers will have the availability of using a new tool that will help them during 
troubleshooting phases of the VTUAV.  This computer hardware system is called 
Maintenance Personal Electronic Display Device (MPEDD) which looks similar to an 
IETMs computer laptop.  The MPEDD is the primary tool used to perform routine AV 
maintenance functions and maintenance engine runs, run BIT checks to obtain AV and 
subsystem statuses, aid with actuator rigging, and interface with the vibration monitor to 
perform Rotor Track & Balance during Functional Check Flight (FCF) evolutions.40  It also 
hosts the tech data library for easy access maintenance inquiries. 
 
VTUAV maintenance record keeping, including IMRL and SE management, will be done 
electronically through NALCOMIS OOMA application.  This system is the same currently 
being utilized for H-60 maintenance administration. 
 
                                                 
37  PMA 263.  Manpower Estimate Report for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (VTUAV).  NAVAIR, March 2007. 
38  NAVAIR.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May 2007. 
39  NAVAIR. VTUAV Program Integrated Logistics Support Overview.  January 2008. 
40  Ibid. 
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b.   Shipboard Support 
 
Maintenance of organic shipboard equipment directly tied to the 
operation of the VTUAV is projected to be covered by shipboard personnel.  This ship-
installed equipment includes: 
 
 •   Integrated GCS 
 •   TCDL Data Suite 
 •   UCARS 
 •   Talon Landing Grid41 
  
HSL-42 Detachment 7 maintenance personnel will be initially conducting all O-level 
maintenance on this ship-installed equipment while onboard USS McInerney.  Analysis is 
currently being conducted to determine the impact to shipboard manpower with respect to 
these critical VTUAV systems.  Until this analysis is complete, AVDET personnel will be 
responsible for maintaining this equipment. 
 
c.   Spare Parts 
 
All maintenance spare parts for the VTUAV will be maintained in a 
similar fashion to those for the H-60 while onboard current surface combatants.  AVDET 
maintenance personnel will have access to pack-up kits (PUKs) consisting of sufficient 
spares and support equipment for up to 30 days of operations (maintaining up to 24 hours 
continuous target coverage).  The 30 day requirement is reviewed and updated annually and 
based on 125 flight hours per month, engineering changes, and maintenance data.  The kits 
are easily transported in standard ISO shipping containers or twenty foot equivalent units 
(TEUs).  Maintenance items included in these PUKs includes the following: 
 
 • Spares and repair parts 
 • Support equipment/common hand tools 
 • Electronic tech data library 
 • Bulk items 
 • Personnel protective equipment (PPE) – i.e., cranials, goggles, personnel flotation 
devices42 
 
There is currently no process for allocating the spare VTUAV Rolls Royce 250-C20W 
engine within PUK inventories.  These repairable items will only be available in theatre/main 
operating bases which will be commercially repaired.   
 
Standard/non-standard parts support will be via Direct Requisitioning Procedures (DRP) case 
and Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangements (CLSSA).  Parts and inventory 
                                                 
41  PMA 263.  Manpower Estimate Report for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (VTUAV).  NAVAIR, March 2007. 
42  NAVAIR. VTUAV Program Integrated Logistics Support Overview.  January 2008. 
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control will be promulgated through the Naval Aviation Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) 
process and procedures with provisioning integrated into predetermined procurement 
schedules.43 
 
d.   Aviation Facilities 
 
Shipboard facilities, such as those found on CG, DDG, and FFG class 
ships, will be able to provide support services and protection and shelter from the elements.  
These facilities do not have to be manipulated or altered to store the VTUAV as they provide 
similar functions to those utilized by SH-60B AVDETs.  Figure 9 below shows the standard 
storage dimensions of the VTUAV both in the full spread and folded positions.  These 
facilities will be able to provide basic support for the VTUAV as well as 28 volt DC power, 





























                                                 
43  NAVAIR.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May 2007. 
44  NAVAIR. VTUAV Program Integrated Logistics Support Overview.  January 2008. 



































III.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Fire Scout VTUAV represents a substantial leap into the future for the LAMPS 
community.  The manning, training, and operation of the Fire Scout will provide a unique set 
of challenges and opportunities.  Using data currently available, the following conclusions 
can be made regarding VTUAV operations by LAMPS detachments.   
 
Team Mayport believes that the VTUAV manning provided under LCS operations will not 
be sufficient to operate under the current environment.  The limitation of 4 Pilots and 3 
Aircrew will not allow for continuous helicopter/VTUAV operations, or 24 hour coverage.  
Additionally, pilot flight hour requirements will need supervision.  Flight hours for training 
and proficiency may be limited due to increased utilization of the VTUAV.  
 
The requirement of training for AVO and MPO operators will require flexibility on the part 
of HSM/HSL squadrons.  Training is currently conducted prior to crew work-up during the 
IDRC.  In the future, training will most likely occur post FRS.  Training times are expected 
to decrease, but more information is needed regarding future expectations.  A need will exist 
to build additional training facilities.  These facilities will likely be under the cognizance of 
the FRS per the VTUAV CONOPS. 
 
The cultural impacts of introducing the VTUAV into fleet squadrons might also prove a 
challenge.  Fire Scout is an extremely automated UAV, with little real flight control given to 
aviators.  Many pilots may feel slighted if assigned to monitor continuous VTUAV 
operations.  Furthermore, it is currently unclear what the ramifications of a VTUAV related 
mishap would be.  With limited AV flight control capability, aircrews may be more reluctant 
to operate the AV.   
 
There will be both positive and negative aspects to future VTUAV operations.  Positive 
aspects may include added operational capability with improved sensor packages, risk 
reduction for aircrew, and potential cost savings.  These cost savings may be derived from 
reduced helicopter fuel consumption and maintenance costs.  Further cost savings could 
materialize from manpower reductions for LCS based detachments.  
 
The associated negative impacts to VTUAV deployment include the limited sensor capability 
of the Fire Scout.  Initial Fire Scout models will only contain the Brite Star II FLIR as its 
primary sensor. In the future VTUAV MMPS will include RADAR, ESM, and forward firing 
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munitions.  It is currently unclear, however, when these new MMPs will be fielded.  Fire 
Scout will also be limited to line of sight operations until other controlling platforms are 
available.  Several safety of flight concerns arise from Fire Scout operations.  These include 
airspace deconfliction, joint operations with multiple aircraft, and reduction in aircrew 
proficiency due to being dual qualified on separate platforms.    
 
The potential pit-falls associated with the future deployment of the Fire Scout with LAMPS 
detachments are numerous, and this report only presents a small portion of the foreseeable 
impacts to manpower, operations, training, and maintenance.  With increased experience, 
more challenges will undoubtedly develop. Team Mayport believes, however, that the 




 1. Utilize current two-plane manning construct for future composite 
aviation detachments. 
 
Team Mayport believes that the maintenance manning will be sufficient to 
meet the needs of Detachment 7‟s upcoming deployment.  The LCS model, however, uses a 
reduced aircrew manning structure of 4 pilots and 3 AWs for flight operations.  Team 
Mayport believes that the LCS manning construct will result in operational limitations, 
including a lack of flexibility, and reduced coverage.   Additionally, the lack of manning will 
reduce training opportunities, and will impact flight hour requirements for aircrew.  HSL-42 
Detachment 7 is currently planning to take 6 pilots and 3 AWs on their 2009 deployment.  
This is consistent with the current two-plane manning construct utilized by wing 
detachments, and Team Mayport believes this to be the correct model for future composite 
aviation detachments.  Existing surface combatants do not possess the same manpower 
constraints as the LCS, and can easily accommodate the current two-plane detachment 
construct.  This will provide greater operational effectiveness, flexibility, and safety.   
 
 2. Consider cultural shifts associated with VTUAV operations, and adjust 
detachment flight hour dispersion accordingly to allow for adequate training and 
proficiency. 
 
The utilization of the Fire Scout will challenge the traditional roles of aircrew. 
Aircrews will be expected to be proficient in, and deploy with, dissimilar platforms for the 
first time.  If not properly accounted for, over reliance on the Fire Scout could have the 
potential of reducing aircrew flight time and proficiency.  Team Mayport recommends Wing 
leadership ensure helicopter/VTUAV flight hour combinations sufficiently account for these 
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potential shortfalls.  The flight hour combinations depicted in our analysis provides an 
adequate benchmark for future operational planning, but needs to be revisited to ensure they 
provide aircrews with the flexibility to perform their mission and train.  HSL-42 Detachment 
7‟s 2009 deployment with the Fire Scout should provide the data necessary to further validate 
these combinations. 
 
Team Mayport also recommends that COMHSMWINGLANT encourage further research 
into the use of enlisted rates as the primary operators of the Fire Scout.  If found to be a 
viable alternative, the use of enlisted personnel should alleviate the need for dual rated 
aircrews, and could reduce the potential degradation of aircrew proficiency.  
 
 3. Recommend conducting a site survey of existing training facilities. 
 
Team Mayport agrees with the recommendations of NAVAIR that training 
facilities for the Fire Scout program should be co-located with the Fleet Replacement 
Squadrons.  This training can be conducted post traditional FRS, but remain under FRS 
cognizance.  The training timeline for VTUAV is expected to shorten, thus reducing the 
impact on FRS resources, and alleviating the impact on detachment IDRC.  CNATTU is 
scheduled to assume responsibility for administering maintenance training.  Once 
maintenance training is turned over from Northrop Grumman, CNATTU should continue 
with this pipe line and routinely train maintenance personnel.  Therefore, Team Mayport 
recommends that COMHSMWINGLANT conduct a sight survey of existing Wing training 
facilities to determine the feasibility of creating additional space for VTUAV training 
devices, to include computer based trainers and simulators.      
 
 4. Review VTUAV operations mid-deployment. 
 
More data is needed regarding Fire Scout shipboard operations and HSM/HSL 
deployments.   This data should be available following HSL-42 Detachment 7‟s deployment 
aboard USS McInerney.  Team Mayport suggests a mid-deployment evaluation of manning, 
operations, training, and maintenance issues to determine the effectiveness of current 







 5. Create a Post Deployment Lessons Learned. 
 
Team Mayport recommends developing a comprehensive list of lessons 
learned during and following Detachment 7‟s VTUAV deployment.  This will provide 
COMHSMWINGLANT, and HSM/HSL detachments with valuable information for future 
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APPENDIX A:  INTERVIEWS 
The following represents a summary of interview questions and answers from AVDET and 
shipboard personnel. 
 
How do you compare Fire Scout with LCS Manning vs. our manning levels? 
 
Currently LCS is planning on using 4 pilots/2 HACs. 
FFG CONOPS will use that same setup as a 2 plane detachment set-up; the plan is to use 6 
Pilots with 2 as HACs. 
 
 
Will detachment manning levels be an issue? 
 
- Pilot manning is not a critical issue; AW numbers could be the only constraint. 
- Berthing constraints are possible but we are not considering duration currently; we are 
going out to prove if the CONOPS will work. 
 
 
What potential problems do you anticipate? 
 
- Problems include restrictions to blue water ops, 6 hour cycles, RAS casualty, and corrosion 
-  The UAV will have FLIR/laser (Brite Star II). 
- Reliability is unknown as well as parts, but a tech rep will be along for the cruise, reliability 
is probably the biggest unknown but it does its own FCF. 
- Weather issues might be a problem; how will we avoid WX and what effect will it have on 
the Fire Scout? 
 
 
Can you accommodate 3 UAVs? 
 
- Probably not enough space for the 3 Fire Scouts when you include the PUK and 
HAZMAT; additionally not sure if why you would use 3 Fire Scouts. 
 
 
How does the maintenance cycle affect your detachment? 
 
- Engine life is an initial constraint, 300 hour limit (currently) but working on 600 hour 
increase. 
- Basic maintenance phases are assumed and a tech rep will be along for this first 
deployment. 




Is the ship ready for Fire Scout? 
 
- Currently the ship is outfitted with a COMMS package and should be ready for the UAV, 
this ship was set for decommissioning but after the waiver was granted it was picked for 
VTUAV. 
- Again, Pilot manning should be good, probably a 3 section duty with overlap. 
 
 
What role do you envision for Fire Scout? 
 
- VTUAV will save a lot of time for shadowing targets and random launches on targets. 
- Training should not be a factor, very limited time during training.  
- Future Romeo will be flown less resulting in lower cost per hour (60-80hr/month). 
- Planning for unforeseen events like medivac makes 6 pilots ideal. 
- SOP generation is currently in the works. 
 
 
What training changes should be done shipboard; what should be done concerning boat 
operations?   
 
- Currently no operational necessity on the upcoming detachment giving greater flexibility to 
use Fire Scout. 
- Lots of unknowns regarding how the Fire Scout will be used during the deployment 
- Concerning VTUAV, an A-Sheet will get signed by a qualified AVO (pilot); authority can 
be transferred in flight.  Feedback has been that AVO operations can be very fatiguing and 
this will impact the usable time of UAV operators.  
 
 
Is the AVO role going to be seen as negative for pilots? 
 
- AVO operations will probably not be as negative of a job for pilots as for AF pilots who fly 
only UAVs for a tour.  The VTUAV is only a secondary aircraft to operate and pilots will 
still be flying the H-60, it will probably be a needed break from flight operations. 
 
 
Will the PUK be an issue? 
 
- No PUK issues currently, but some concerns regarding HAZMAT.  Currently the H-60 and 
UAV are not using the same HAZMAT; this might create storage problems in a limited space 
HAZMAT locker.  We are looking into what HAZMAT can be consolidated.   
- No current planned UAV rotation; maintenance phases will probably determine cycle.  The 
Fire Scout is not a marinized airframe; it could have major corrosion issues; it is not an all 




How does this affect your training cycle? Work-ups? 
 
- Current UAV training involves 40 days for an AVO and 12 days for a MPO at PAX River. 
- Ship might be having manning issues regarding general personnel.   
 
 
How will squadron training be affected? 
 
- The test group has a very constrained training cycle.  In the future it might be tough for 2Ps 
to balance A/C and UAV cycles; we will need more HACs for the upcoming deployment to 
allow for the steep learning curves for the UAV.  This brings up a huge concern for training 
2Ps, how pilots will handle learning two aircraft at the same time.  With the new Romeo 
training anticipated to be more challenging. 
 
 
Is a NATOPS available? 
 
- Currently still writing NATOPS.   
 
 
Where is the GCS? 
 
- GCS is not in Hanger it is in the STIR equipment room; there seems to be plenty of room in 
this compartment for added personnel to observe and train on the equipment. 
 
 
Can you envision shipboard personnel operating the equipment?  
 
- AW/MPO role could be interchangeable with shipboard members probably not yet ready to 
replace the AVO position considering airspace knowledge and the OPNAV 3710 
requirements. 
- Crew rest for the UAV is the same as for the aircraft.   
- Not very concerned that this will replace the aircraft in its current form.  The laser role will 
be a major asset, and future sensor packages will be an even greater asset. 
 
 
Will you have any issues accommodating manning for detachments with Fire Scout on the 
FFG? 
 
- No issues with manning of FFG currently; there is space available for the detachment size, 






What problems are you currently anticipating with Fire Scout? 
 
- Currently we anticipate fueling issues; the problem is with dissimilar pressure requirements 
of the Fire Scout and H-60, this is being discussed with PMA-266.  
- Rotor arc and ground pad concerns are also a factor, maintenance and ship crew who are 
not familiar with these things; it will take time to adjust for the differences. 
 
 
What are your biggest issues getting ready for Fire Scout? 
 
- Desire to test and adapt new SOPs.  
- Larger impacts to the crew will come during operational testing. 
 
 
What operation impacts will the Fire Scout program have? 
 
- Tactically this is a huge advancement.  
- OTHT will be a key addition when added to the sensor package. 
- 24 hour coverage is the current hope, but the mission and environment will dictate this. 
 
 
Do you foresee any manning issues for the deployment? 
 
- No manning issues currently for either air detachment or shipboard personnel. 
- We anticipate a possible DDG integration in the future with unique manning concerns.  
- Foresee in the future that pilots will not be necessary to operate the UAV because of 
automation; could easily see the use of shipboard personnel operating the UAV in the future. 
- Use of the word “fly” is not necessary – paradigm shift. 
 
 
How to you like the location of the GCS? 
 
- No issues with GCS.  The STIR equipment room provides an excellent space, well located 
and plenty of cooling for equipment; best space might be CIC, but this is a good second.  
 
 
Do you have any concerns with HAZMAT or PUK storage? 
 
- HAZMAT is not seen as an issue, probably over carrying current supply. 
- The PUK is probably not a size problem but it will require creative storing; all the 






Do you have any concerns with the location of the UCARS antenna or other equipment? 
 
- The UCARS antenna is a single point failure and we are looking at putting another UCARS 
antenna aft to add redundancy; UAV recovery is less extreme; if the UAV loses the ship, it 
will meet up at location and try a UCARS capture-only.  Issues will be coordination of a 
feasible recovery zone.  More data points are needed and will be recorded on first watch. 
 30 




































































LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. GlobalSecurity.org. Littoral Combat Ship Program. [Accessed on 15 February, 2009] 
available from the World Wide Web 
@http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcs-program.htm 
2. Defense Industry Daily. The USA‟s New Littoral Combat Ships.  [Accessed on 15 
February, 2009] available from the World Wide Web 
@http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-01343/ 
3. Pike, John. Vertical Take Off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) 
Overview.  Federation of American Scientists, 2000. [Accessed on 15 February, 2009] 
available from the World Wide Web @http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/vtuav.htm  
4. Pike, John. MQ-8B Fire Scout.  GlobalSecurity.org, 2007.  [Accessed on 14 February 
2009]  Available on the World Wide Web 
@http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/mq-8b.htm 
5. Freeland, Rene. MQ-8B Fact Sheet. Northrop Grumman, 2008. [Accessed on 14 
February 2009]  Available on the World Wide Web 
@http://www.is.northropgrumman.com/systems/system_pdfs/FS-Fact-Sheet.pdf  
 
6. NAVAIR.  VTUAV Concept of Operations (DRAFT).  16 May, 2007. 
 
7. PMA 263.  Manpower Estimate Report for the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV).  NAVAIR, March 2007. 
 
8. Northrop Grumman. RQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air Vehicle. 
[Accessed 12 JAN 2009] Available from World Wide Web 
@http://www.is.northropgrumman.com/systems/system_pdfs/FireScout-New-Brochure.pdf 
 
9. Jane‟s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets. Northrop Grumman, MQ-8 Fire Scout  
[Accessed 12 JAN 2009] Available from World Wide Web @http://juav.janes.com/ 
public/juav/index.html      
 
10. NAVAIR. NAVAIR Demonstrates UAV Control At Highest Level. [Accessed 12 
January 2009] Available from World Wide Web 
@http://uav.navair.navy.mil/new_firescout/news/rotorhub(UK).pdf 
 
11.  PMA 263. VTUAV Integrated Logistics Support Overview. NAVAIR, 2008. 
 
12. Criger, Tom. Aviation Manning Aboard LCS. U.S. Fleet Forces Command,  October 
2006. 
 33 
13. Rose, William. NAVAIR 1.2 Aviation/Ship Integration Team.  Email dated 9 
February, 2009. 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 35 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. CAPT Glen Doyle, USN 
Commander Helicopter Maritime Strike Wing Atlantic Fleet 
Mayport, Florida 
 
2. CDR Dana Gordon, USN 
Commander Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light FOUR TWO 
Mayport, Florida 
 
3. LCDR Robert Williams, USN 
Detachment SIX Officer in Charge 
 Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light FOUR TWO 
Mayport, Florida 
 
4. LT Mathew Luotto, USN 
VTUAV Fleet Integration Team 
Commander Naval Air Forces 
 San Diego, California 
 
5. Professor Frank R. “Chip” Wood 












































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
